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WHC-SD-SNF-RPT-004, REV 2 A b s t r a c t : T h i s document s p e c i f i e s t h e n a t u r a l phenomena loads f o r t h e C a n i s t e r Storage B u i l d i n g i n t h e 200 East Area o f t h e
INTRODUCTION
T h i s document s p e c i f i e s n a t u r a l phenomena hazard (NPH) loads f o r use i n t h e design and c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e C a n i s t e r Storage B u i l d i n g (CSB), which w i l l be l o c a t e d i n t h e 200 East Area o f t h e Hanford S i t e . Energy (DOE) r e g u l a t o r y p o l i c y f o r these design and c o n s t r u c t i o n a c t i v i t i e s r e q u i r e s a l e v e l o f n u c l e a r s a f e t y comparable t o t h a t o f U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) l i c e n s e d f a c i l i t i e s . The DOE requirements are based on DOE Order 5480.28, N a t u r a l Phenomena Hazards M i t i g a t i o n ; and s u p p o r t i n g standards, DOE-STD-1020-94, N a t u r a l Phenomena Hazards Design and E v a l u a t i o n C r i t e r i a f o r Department o f Energy F a c i l i t i e s ; DOE-STD-1022-94, N a t u r a l Phenomena Hazards S i t e C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s C r i t e r i a ; and DOE-STD-1023-95, N a t u r a l Phenomena Hazards Assessment C r i t e r i a . DOE Order 5480.28 r e q u i r e s t h a t each s t r u c t u r e , system, and component be assigned t o one o f f i v e performance c a t e g o r i e s based on s a f e t y c l a s s and hazard category. performance category has an associated NPH goal t h a t serves as a measure o f t h e l e v e l o f p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t p o t e n t i a l n a t u r a l phenomena. The CSB has been designated a Performance Category 3 f a c i l i t y (WHC 1996) . The NRC requirements are based on T i t l e 10, Code o f Federal Regulations, P a r t 72, " L i c e n s i n g Requirements f o r t h e Independent Storage o f Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste" (10 CFR 72).
and DOE requirements i s accomplished by u s i n g t h e more s t r i n g e n t o f t h e requirements f o r t h e design. The seismic design f o r t h i s complex i s t h o r o u g h l y discussed i n WHC-SD-SNF-DB-004, Spent Nuclear F u e l P r o j e c t Seismic Design C r i t e r i a (WHC 1996) . The NPH design loads and t h e a p p l i c a t i o n documents t o be f o l l o w e d f o r t h e CSB are summarized i n Table 1. The remainder o f t h i s document provides more d e t a i l on NPH loads and reviews t h e d e r i v a t i o n o f these loads.
U.S. Department o f Each
With t h e exception o f seismic design c r i t e r i a , t h e compliance t o b o t h NRC 2.0 SEISMIC CRITERIA
BACKGROUND
A comparison o f t h e NRC and DOE seismic design requirements and a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e CSB seismic design s t r a t e g y are presented i n WHC-SD-SNF-DB-004 (WHC 1996) and are n o t repeated here. design requirements are b e i n g used f o r t h e CSB and are summarized i n t h i s s e c t i o n .
The DOE seismic DB-009.R3 Table 1 Vitrification Plant and construction on the foundation has been partially completed (WHC 1992) . Newmark and Hall (1978) median response spectra at 0.35 g horizontal and 0.23 g vertical were developed for this facility. response spectra are shown to envelop the Performance Category 3 response spectra for the location of the CSB (Figure 2 ). spectra are conservative compared to the Performance Category 3 design criteria and shall be used for the completion of the CSB design and construction following the design requirements of DOE-STD-1020-94.
Performance Category 1 and 2
Use standard occupancy rules for Performance Category 1 and
The CSB originally was designed to serve as part of the Hanford Waste
Those
The CSB design response 3.0 WIND AND TORNADO CRITERIA
BACKGROUND
The Hanford Site is located in a semiarid region of southeastern Washington. the Hanford Site by causing a "rain shadow" effect. This mountain range also serves as a source of cold air drainage, which has considerable effect on the wind regime of the Hanford Site. .
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.01 30 years of pre-1979 Hanford S i t e wind data. F i g u r e 3 and a r e t h e b a s i s f o r t h e recommended wind speeds f o r t h e Hanford S i t e l i s t e d i n DOE-STD-1020-94, Table 3 -2.
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The wind m i s s i l e s are l i s t e d i n DOE-STO-1020-94, Table 3-1. f o r P r o b a b i l i s t i c R i s k Assessment (Ramsdell e t a l . 1986), d e s c r i b e s a procedure f o r e s t i m a t i n g extreme wind p r o b a b i l i t i e s . The a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s methodology t o Hanford S i t e data, i n c l u d i n g post-1979 data, r e s u l t e d i n t h e hazard curves shown i n F i g u r e 3. There are no known l o c a l m e t e o r o l o g i c a l events o r changes i n methodology s i n c e 1986 t h a t would cause s i g n i f i c a n t changes t o t h e Hanford S i t e wind hazard. 
The s t r a i g h t wind hazard exceedance p r o b a b i l i t y f o r Performance Category 3 i s 1 x On F i g u r e 3, t h i s i s approximately 30 m/s (67 mi/h) (Coats and Murray 1985) and 32 m/s (72 mi/h) (Ramsdell e t a l . 1986). I n DOE-STD-1020-94, t h e minimum s t r a i g h t wind speed f o r Performance Category 3 design i s 35.8 m/s (80 mi/h), which i s h i g h e r than e i t h e r o f t h e wind hazard s t u d i e s and i s , t h e r e f o r e , t h e design b a s i s f o r t h e S i t e . A 6.81 kg (15 l b )
t i m b e r p l a n k m i s s i l e , 0.61 m X 1.22 m (2 f t X 4 f t ) , i s a p p l i e d t o Performance Category 3 SSCs a t 22.4 m/s (50 mi/h) t o a h e i g h t o f 9 m (30 ft). These wind c r i t e r i a are g r e a t e r t h a n NRC requirements and are a p p l i e d t o t h e CSB.
The i n t e r s e c t i o n o f t h e s t r a i g h t wind and tornado hazard curves determines whether tornadoes should be i n c l u d e d i n t h e design and e v a l u a t i o n c r i t e r i a (Coats and Murray 1985). I f t h e exceedance p r o b a b i l i t y a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n i s l e s s t h a n 2 x s t r a i g h t winds c o n t r o l t h e d e s i g n c r i t e r i a .
I n F i g u r e 3, t h i s i n t e r s e c t i o n i s a t 3 x (Coats and Murray 1985) and 8 x (Ramsdell e t a l . 1986). Therefore, f o l l o w i n g DOE guidance, t h e Hanford S i t e does n o t have a DOE design b a s i s tornado. The Standard Review Plan s e c t i o n on wind l o a d i n g (NRC 1981, 3.3 .1) i s s p e c i f i c and serves as a b a s i s f o r d e t e r m i n i n g a p p r o p r i a t e s t r a i g h t wind and tornado values f o r t h e CSB because i t has been accepted by t h e NRC f o r i s s u i n g t h e m a t e r i a l s l i c e n s e s f o r such f a c i l i t i e s . The 100-year, f a s t e s t -m i l e wind speed i s used f o r t h e s t r a i g h t wind c a l c u l a t i o n s u s i n g American S o c i e t y o f C i v i l Engineers methodology (ASCE 1993 , ASCE 1961 . The 100-year, f a s t e s t -m i l e wind a t t h e
The guidance i n 10 CFR 72 w i t h r e s p e c t t o s t r a i g h t wind and tornado
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F i g u r e 3 . S t r a i g h t Wind and Tornado Hazards. 
Wind Speed (meterdsec)
22
CVDS
Hanford S i t e i s about 105 km/h (65 mi/h) ( F i g u r e 3 ) . However, because DOE-STD-1020-94 r e q u i r e s a minimum o f 129 km/h (80 mi/h) f o r Performance Category 3, t h e h i g h e r DOE v a l u e w i l l be used f o r t h e design o f t h e CSB.
(WNP-2), l o c a t e d on p r o p e r t y w i t h i n t h e boundaries o f t h e Hanford S i t e , was l i c e n s e d t o use tornado design wind speeds o f 483 km/h (300 mi/h) r o t a t i o n a l and 97 km/h (60 mi/h) t r a n s l a t i o n a l , w i t h a pressure drop o f 2,109 kg/m2 (3 l b / i n 2 ) o c c u r r i n g a t 703 kg/m2/s (1.0 l b / i n 2 / s ) . These wind speeds are h i g h e r than would be r e q u i r e d by Regulatory Guide 1.76, Design B a s i s Tornado f o r N u c l e a r Power P l a n t s (NRC 1974).
Hanford S i t e i s i n tornado Region 111 f o r which t h e c r i t e r i a are 305 km/h (190 mi/h) r o t a t i o n a l and 80 km/h (50 mi/h) t r a n s l a t i o n a l , w i t h a 1,055 kg/m2 (1.5 l b / i n 2 ) pressure drop a t 422 kg/m2/s (0.6 l b / i n 2 / s ) . The NRC s t a f f have proposed d i v i d i n g t h e U n i t e d States i n t o two r e g i o n s and making t h e t o t a l r o t a t i o n a l and t r a n s l a t i o n wind speeds f o r s i t e s west o f t h e Rocky Mountains 322 km/h (200 mi/h) (NRC 1993) . hazards study, NUREG/CR-4461, Tornado C l i m a t o l o g y o f t h e Contiguous U n i t e d S t a t e s (Ramsdell and Andrews 1986) . The Supply System requested ( P a r r i s h 1995; see Appendix A) a r e v i s i o n o f t h e WNP-2 tornado c r i t e r i a based upon t h e NRC s t a f f ' s proposal f o r tornado wind speeds west o f t h e Rocky Mountains (NRC 1993) and on t h e s t a f f ' s acceptance o f t h e design b a s i s tornado c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n NUREG-1503, F i n a l S a f e t y E v a l u a t i o n Report R e l a t e d to the
C e r t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e Advanced B o i l i n g Water Reactor Design (NRC 1994). impact v e l o c i t i e s f o r t h e proposed tornado m i s s i l e spectrum based on t h e reduced wind speed o f 322 km/h (200 mi/h) were c a l c u l a t e d by t h e Supply
System. The NRC accepted t h e proposed l o w e r tornado m i s s i l e c r i t e r i a ( C l i f f o r d 1996; see Appendix 6). The CSB tornado design requirements, i n c l u d i n g design m i s s i l e s , a r e l i s t e d below:
Wind speed Washington P u b l i c Power Supply System (Supply System) Nuclear P l a n t 2
Regulatory Guide 1.76 i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e The b a s i s f o r t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s a tornado
The -322 km/h (200 mi/h) t o t a l -257 km/h (160 mi/h) r o t a t i o n a l -64 km/h (40 mi/h) t r a n s l a t i o n a l The missiles are considered to strike surfaces in any direction, and the vertical velocities are 70% of the horizontal velocities except for the 1-in. steel rod, which has the same velocity in any direction. The utility pole and automobile are considered to strike surfaces up to a maximum of 9.1 m (30 ft) above the highest finished grade within 0.8 km (0.5 mi) of the plant. The other missiles can strike at any elevation.
-Automobile
An alternative set of CSB design missiles that may be applied to the CSB has been developed for the 322 km/h (200 mi/h) total wind speed (Fluor Daniel 1996) . They are listed below. 
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An alternative to providing tornado missile protection for all safetyclass and important-to-safety SSCs is to address the need for protection of specific targets on a risk assessment basis. made of the probability that a tornado generated missile will strike a particular target and fail the target in such a way that unacceptable consequences result. For facilities with relative small targets areas, the risk assessment can simply investigate the probability that a missile strikes a target. target, or simply striking the target, satisfies established acceptance criteria, then no physical barriers against missiles need be provided.
to provide tornado-generated missile protection for specific targets has been accepted by the NRC for several years and is well documented in their review and design guidante. The probability of a tornado occurring near the site and generating a P , , = P, x P , x P, x P, where P , , = The annual probability of a tornado missile striking such that an unacceptable radiological or chemical release occurs P, = The tornado annual point strike frequency (events/yr) P , = The probability o f a tornado-generated missile impacting a specific target (this includes the probabilities of the missile existing on the site, being lifted, and striking the target of a given area) P, = The probability of target failure as a result of being struck by a missile (this considers that not all missiles that strike the target will be of sufficient energy to fail the target) DB-009.R3
P, = The p r o b a b i l i t y , g i v e n t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e t a r g e t by a m i s s i l e , t h a t unacceptable r a d i o l o g i c a l o r chemical r e l e a s e occurs ( t h i s considers t h a t n o t a l l t a r g e t f a i l u r e s w i l l be o f s u f f i c i e n t s e v e r i t y t o r e s u l t i n unacceptable consequences).
The above expression i s s i m p l i f i e d i n t h a t t h e analyses are u s u a l l y performed f o r a range o f tornado i n t e n s i t i e s and p o t e n t i a l m i s s i l e s . tornado i n t e n s i t i e s considered are based upon a v a i l a b l e l o c a l severe weather data. a b i l i t y t o be l i f t e d by a tornado o f a g i v e n i n t e n s i t y ; and a b i l i t y t o damage t h e t a r g e t . The m i s s i l e s a p p r o p r i a t e f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n are o f t e n e s t a b l i s h e d by a s i t e survey f o r a r a d i u s o f about 600 m (2,000 f t ) .
based upon r e a l i s t i c s e l e c t i o n o f p o t e n t i a l m i s s i l e s based upon a s i t e survey. It does n o t adopt t h e NRC tornado m i s s i l e spectrum, which i s more a p p r o p r i a t e f o r an upper bound m e c h a n i s t i c a n a l y s i s .
The The m i s s i l e s considered v a r y i n terms o f t h e i r d e n s i t y on t h e s i t e , It should be noted i n t h e above equation t h a t t h e m i s s i l e s e l e c t i o n i s
VOLCANIC ASH CRITERIA
BACKGROUND
Volcanic hazards t h a t have a f f e c t e d t h e Hanford S i t e i n t h e p a s t 20 m i l l i o n years are of two types: (1) c o n t i n e n t a l f l o o d b a s a l t volcanism t h a t produced t h e Columbia R i v e r B a s a l t Group, which u n d e r l i e s t h e Hanford S i t e , outcropping i n t h e surrounding r i d g e s ; and (2) volcanism associated w i t h t h e Cascade Range. considered t o be a c t i v e , b u t a c t i v i t y associated w i t h f l o o d b a s a l t volcanism has ceased. occurred between 17 m i l l i o n and 6 m i l l i o n years b e f o r e present (BP). t h e l a v a was extruded d u r i n g t h e f i r s t 2 t o 2.5 m i l l i o n years o f t h e 1 1 -m i l l i o n -y e a r v o l c a n i c episode. t h e l a s t 6 m i l l i o n years, suggesting c e s s a t i o n o f t h e t e c t o n i c processes t h a t c r e a t e d t h e episode. considered t o be a c r e d i b l e v o l c a n i c hazard (DOE 1988).
Epoch (approximately 2 m i l l i o n years BP t o 10,000 years BP), through t h e Holocene Epoch (10,000 y e a r s BP t o p r e s e n t ) . The e r u p t i o n h i s t o r y o f t h e Holocene b e s t c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e most l i k e l y t y p e s o f a c t i v i t y i n t h e n e x t 100 years.
i n c l u d i n g Mount Mazama ( C r a t e r Lake) and Mount Hood i n Oregon, and Mount S t . Helens, Mount Adams, and Mount R a i n i e r i n Washington 
. Helens, t h e t h r e e c l o s e s t a c t i v e volcanoes. A t these d i s t a n c e s , t h e t e p h r a (ash) i s t h e o n l y hazard. Mount S t . Helens has been c o n s i d e r a b l y more a c t i v e throughout t h e Holocene than Mount R a i n i e r o r Mount Adams, which i s t h e l e a s t a c t i v e o f t h e t h r e e . The remainder o f t h i s d i s c u s s i o n addresses t h e c r i t e r i a f o r v o l c a n i c ash.
Several volcanoes i n t h e Cascade Range are c u r r e n t l y
The f l o o d b a s a l t volcanism t h a t produced t h e Columbia R i v e r B a s a l t Group Most o f Volcanic a c t i v i t y has n o t r e c u r r e d d u r i n g The recurrence o f Columbia R i v e r b a s a l t volcanism i s n o t Volcanism i n t h e Cascade Range has been a c t i v e throughout t h e Pleistocene
Many o f t h e volcanoes have been a c t i v e i n t h e l a s t 10,000 years, 
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Probabilistic volcanic hazard studies of the
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
loads. Criteria for determining design basis ash loads were developed specifically for the Hanford Site (Salmon 1996) to ensure that the performance goals of DOE Order 5480.28 are met. recommended risk reduction factors for the Hanford Site given in Table 2 are based on the hazard curve shown in Figure 6 . For Performance Categories 1, 2, and 3, ashfall need not be considered because it is not a controlling load when using the load combinations for the design and analysis found in DOE has no specific orders or standards setting design criteria for ash The design basis ashfall loads and DOE-STD-1020-94.
Operations that require air filtration or heating, ventilation, or air conditioning throughout an ashfall event must take into account the impact of suspended ash on the operation. precedes volcanic hazards, especially distal ashfall. First, there is almost always increased seismic activity at the volcano from days to years before large eruptions. Further, heat gradients often increase, steam and smaller eruptions may be emitted from the volcano, and measurable deformation may occur on the volcano's surface. All these warnings provide a general alert and increase emergency preparedness in the immediate area of the volcano as well as downwind in an area like the Hanford Site. Second, it would take approximately 2 hours for ash from the closest active volcanoes to reach the Hanford Site (Scheidegger et al. 1982 ). much higher probability that the ash will affect the Site. This warning may lend itself to administrative controls for ashfall mitigation. Administrative procedures implemented after an eruption should be used when mitigation can be achieved through evacuation; reconfiguration of the structure, system, or component; operation shutdown; or other activities appropriate for the specific facility or operation. Should it be determined that a safe configuration cannot be achieved during the 2-hour warning time preceding the ashfall, the appropriate suspended ash load will be determined. Operations t h a t r e q u i r e a i r f i l t r a t i o n o r heating, v e n t i l a t i o n , o r a i r c o n d i t i o n i n g throughout an a s h f a l l event must t a k e i n t o account t h e impact o f suspended ash on t h e o p e r a t i o n . Cold Creek and Dry Creek are ephemeral streams on t h e western p o r t i o n o f t h e Hanford S i t e . These streams are n o t o f concern f o r t h e CSB s i t e as t h e y are i n t h e Yakima R i v e r drainage b a s i n and t h e CSB i s i n t h e Columbia R i v e r drainage b a s i n . The probable maximum f l o o d i s approximately 30 m (100 f t ) 
Unlike most other
FLOOD CRITERIA
BACKGROUND
The CSB s i t e i s a t an e l e v a t i o n o f about 213 m (700 ft) above mean sea l e v e l . The Columbia R i v e r i s c l o s e s t t o t h e CSB a t r i v e r k i l o m e t e r 595 ( m i l e 370) where t h e normal f l o w i s a t approximately 115 rn
below t h e e l e v a t i o n o f t h e d i v i d e between t h e Columbia R i v e r and t h e Yakima R i v e r (Skaggs and Walters 1981). The CS8 s i t e i s a f l o o d -d r y s i t e w i t h r e s p e c t t o r i
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
DOE guidance i n DOE-STD-1020-94 s t a t e s t h a t t h e performance g o a l s f o r SSCs must be s a t i s f i e d when subjected t o t h e design b a s i s f l o o d l e v e l f o r l o c a l p r e c i p i t a t i o n . T h i s can be done through design f e a t u r e s t o p r o v i d e s u f f i c i e n t r u n o f f c a p a c i t y land through f a c i l i t y strengthening. performance goal i s 1 x 10-f o r a Performance Category 3 s t r u c t u r e such as t h e CSB. The probable maximum p r e c i p i t a t i o n (PMP) i s c o n s e r v a t i v e l y assumed 
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The NRC requirement is the PMP, which is a lower probability storm and higher precipitation value than the DOE requirement. conservative than using the PMP for th; general storm, which occurs over a larger area. be used for the CSB design (Table 3) . 
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DESIGN
PMP local general
Notes: P r e c i p i t a t i o n depths are i n inches.
To convert t o centimeters, r m l t i p l y by 2.54. Based on Reference 5, Section 3.3.2, total tomado loads resulting from wind loads, differential pressure loads, and tornado generated missiles will be established from the following equations: I I I as defmed in Section 2.0 of Reference 3. Based on the extensive studies which defme site specific tornado hazards for the Hanford area, these wind speed and pressure drop p a m e t e r s are conservative for the WIG'-2 site. These studies are discussed in detail in the report anached to Reference 2.
In addition, the Supply System is proposing that the missiles to be considered consist of the full spectrum of missiles contained in Reference 5, Section 3.5.1.4. For those missiles, the proposed velocities are based on the above wind speed and pressure drop p m e t e n . These missile velocities were developed by the Supply System using a methodology that we feel is consistent with that used to develop the SRP missile velocities. The Supply System will formalize the calculations associated with the development of these missile velocities after MC has concurred with the proposed revised tornado design criteria, but prior to use in design work.
By implementing the proposed revisions, the tornado design criteria will conservatively reflect the tornado hazards at W -2 while maintaining the objective of providmg an annual probability of exceedance of desiq loads of less than or equal to 1 x I O ' . These revisions will result in more realistic wind velocities, differential pressure loads, missile velocities, and load combinations.. The proposed revisions will benefit the design of exterior smctures and components that must consider postulated tornado effects. Signifcant benefit is expected during the implementxion of future plant modifications where the revised tornado desig criteria will facilitate construction. By l e t t e r dated January 6 , 1994, a s modified by l e t t e r dated October 10, 1995, you requested s t a f f review and approval of a proposed revision t o the tornado design c r i t e r i a f o r WNP-2. By letter dated January 6, 1994, the Washington Public Power Supply System (the Supply System or the licensee) requested the staff's approval to revise the tornado design criteria for the WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2, (WNP-2). letter dated July 13, 1995, the staff requested additional justification for the licensee's proposed maximum composite wind speed of 192 mph. By letter dated October 10, 1995, the Supply System modified their propased maximum composite wind speed to 200 mph and provided supporting justification. The current licensing basis tornado design criteria for WNP-2 are wind speeds of 300 miles per hour (mph) rotational and 60 mph translational. The proposed change, as requested in the October 10, 1995 submittal, would revise the criteria to establish the total design basis tornado wind speed at 200 mph (160 mph rotational and 40 mph translational). The request is based on the design basis tornado characteristics (for the tornado intensi!y region in which WNP-2 is located) accepted by the staff in NUREG-1503, Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Certification of the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor Design," July 1994.
EVALUATION
The current licensing basis tornado design criteria for WNP-2 are based on a tornado Region I plant site as defined in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.76, "Design Basis Tcrnailo foi-Nucloar Fower Piants." These are excessive criteria for WNP-2 because it is located in a tornado Region 111 as defined in RG 1.76. The licensee's proposed tornado wind speed is also less than the wind speed identified in RG 1.76 for a design basis Region I11 tornado. This further reduction in tornado design criteria is consistent with the design basis characteristics accepted by the staff in NUREG-1503. establishes revised design basis tornado characteristics that are acceptable to the staff.
In NUREG-1503, the staff refers to SECY-93-087, "Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light-Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs,'' dated April 2 , 1993, as a basis for revised tornado wind speeds. positions in RG 1.76 using the considerable quantity of tornado data which has become available since RG 1.76 was developed. This reevaluation is discussed By The licensee's proposed revision is consistent with that table.
As described in SECY-93-087, the staff reevaluated the regulatory WHC-SO-SNF-DB-009 REV 3 -2 -i n NUREG/CR-4661, "Tornado Climatology of t h e Contiguous United S t a t e s , " dated May 1986. NUREG/CR-4661, t h e s t a f f concluded ( i n SECY-93-087) t h a t i t i s acceptable t o reduce t h e tornado design b a s i s wind speeds t o 322 kilometers per hour (km/hr) (200 mph) f o r s t a t e s west of t h e Rocky Mountains and t o 482 h / h r (300 mph) f o r s t a t e s e a s t of t h e Rocky Mountains. The s t a f f , t h e r e f o r e , concludes t h a t t h e l i c e n s e e ' s proposed reduction in design b a s i s tornado wind speed t o 200 mph i s acceptable f o r WNP-2 which i s located west of t h e Rocky Mountains. l i c e n s e e ' s proposed pressure drop and r a t e o f pressure drop associated w i t h t h e 200 mph tornado a r e a l s o acceptable because they a r e consistent w i t h t h e design b a s i s tornado c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s found acceptable t o t h e s t a f f i n Table
The l i c e n s e e also proposea t o revise che design b a s i s tornado m i s s i l e spectrum associated w i t h t h e revised design basis tornado f o r WNP-2. c a l c u l a t e d t h e impact v e l o c i t i e s f o r t h e proposed tornado missile spectrum based on the reduced wind speed of 200 mph. Missile Spectrum I1 i d e n t i f i e d in Section 3.5.1.4 of t h e Standard Review Plan (SRP). SRP, t h e s t a f f concludes t h a t i t i s acceptable.
I t should a l s o be recognized t h a t t h e tornado design b a s i s requirements have been used in e s t a b l i s h i n g s t r u c t u r a l requirements (minimum concrete wall thicknesses) f o r t h e protection of safety-related s t r u c t u r e s , systems, and components a g a i n s t e f f e c t s not covered e x p l i c i t l y i n review guidance such as r e g u l a t o r y guides and t h e Standard Review Plan. S p e c i f i c a l l y , some aviation (general a v i a t i o n 1 i g h t a i r c r a f t ) crashes, nearby explosions, and explosion d e b r i s o r m i s s i l e s have been reviewed and evaluated r o u t i n e l y by t h e s t a f f by taking i n t o account t h e existence of t h e tornado protection requirements. Therefore, f o r any new s t r u c t u r e s t h a t a r e b u i l t using t h e revised tornado design c r i t e r i a , t h e l i c e n s e e should perform an a n a l y s i s under 10 CFR 50.59 t o v e r i f y t h a t t h e s t r u c t u r e s are adequate, based on minimum wall thickness, have w a l l s t h i c k enough t o protect against o t h e r postulated s i t e -s p e c i f i c hazards o r loads t h a t may have been previously subsumed within t h e tornado design b a s i s .
Based on t h e updated tornado d a t a and t h e a n a l y s i s provided i n The 2-1 o f NUREG-1503.
The l i c e n s e e The l i c e n s e e ' s proposal used Because t h e m i s s i l e spectrum i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Section 3.5.1.4 of t h e 3.0 , corJc1,UsIoI' Based on t h e above evaluation, the s t a f f concludes t h a t t h e licensee's proposed revised c r i t e r i a f o r the design b a s i s tornado a r e i n accordance w i t h t h e g u i d e l i n e s of RG 1.76 regarding t h e m i s s i l e spectrum and with t h e s t a f f ' s revised design b a s i s tornado c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s s e t f o r t h in NUREG-1503. s t a f f , t h e r e f o r e , concludes t h a t the proposed changes a r e acceptable. 
